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THE CHICAGO CONVENTION: ARTICLE 33 AND
THE SFAR 40 EPISODE
STEPHEN D. MCCREARY*
F THE BENEFITS offered by air transport are to be
fully utilized, today's world of civil aviation demands ex-
tensive international cooperation. Concerns for. safety
dictate the broadest possible standardization and uni-
formity in aircraft, airports, air traffic control, and the like.
International use of the airways requires agreement on
the freedom of air navigation.' Foreseeing these needs,
the United States sent out feelers toward the close of
World War II seeking to arrange an international aviation
conference. This effort resulted in the Convention on In-
ternational Civil Aviation 2 which convened at Chicago, Il-
linois, between November 1 and December 7, 1944. 3
* Member, New York State Bar and Province of Ontario Bar. B.A., 1979,
Queens University; L.L.B., 1981, University of Toronto; L.L.M., 1989, George-
town University Law Center. The author wishes to thank Allan I. Mendelsohn and
Jeffrey N. Shane for helpful commentary during preparation of this article.
I See INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION, FACTS ABOUT ICAO PUBLIC
INFORMATION OFFICE 1 (Aug. 1985). This brochure provides that "there must be
international standardization, agreement between nations in all the technical and
economic and legal fields so that the air can be the high road to carry man and his
goods anywhere and everywhere without fetter and without halt." Id.
2 Convention on International Civil Aviation, opened for signature Dec. 7, 1944,
61 Stat. 1180, T.I.A.S. No. 1591, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 [hereinafter Chicago
Convention].
-1 The occurrence of two world wars in less than a generation influenced many
nations to seek means of international cooperation as World War II drew to a
close. Examples include the United Nations for politics, the International Mone-
tary Fund for financial matters, and the International Court of Justice for legal
disputes. The Chicago Convention was the aviation counterpart, stating in its
preamble that "it is desirable to avoid friction and to promote that cooperation
between nations and people upon which the peace of the world depends ......
Chicago Convention, supra note 2, at Preamble. After its formation under the
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The work of the Convention generated the document
now known simply as the Chicago Convention,4 a treaty
covering a broad range of international civil aviation is-
sues. In concluding this agreement, the drafters believed
they had "agreed on certain principles and arrangements
in order that international civil aviation may be developed
in a safe and orderly manner."' 5 The subject matter of
safety and of orderly development overlapped when the
issue of determining airworthiness for purposes of inter-
national navigation was considered. To assist convenient
use of the freedoms of air navigation on which the Chi-
cago Convention had agreed,6 but protect host nations
from unsafe aircraft, the drafters adopted Article 33. This
Article provided that airworthiness certificates of foreign
States would be recognized, provided they had been is-
sued under conditions which achieved certain minimum
standards set out elsewhere in the Chicago Convention.7
In 1979, this system of reciprocal recognition met with
a serious challenge. In response to grave safety concerns
surrounding the design of the McDonnell Douglas DC-10
aircraft, the United States denied to foreign DC-10s cus-
tomary air navigation rights in the United States for a pe-
riod of five weeks. The action was taken on grounds that
the airworthiness of the foreign operated aircraft was sus-
pect, notwithstanding foreign certificates of airworthiness.
To prevent the operation of DC-Os on foreign registry in
United States airspace, the Administrator of the Federal
Chicago Convention, the ICAO became affiliated with the United Nations and was
recognized as its specialized agency for civil aviation. See K. POWER, HISTORY AND
EXPLANATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION 1 (1980) (un-
published document available from the author of this article).
4 The Chicago Convention produced three other agreements: (1) the Interim
Agreement, (2) the International Air Transport (Five Freedoms) Agreement, and
(3) the International Air Services Transit (Two Freedoms) Agreement. See K.
POWER, supra note 3, at 2.
Chicago Convention, supra note 2, at Preamble.
The Chicago Convention itself agreed on the first and second freedoms of air
navigation for non-scheduled flights. The first freedom permits transit through
the airspace of another sovereign, and the second freedom permits non-traffic
(noncommercial or emergency) stops in foreign territory. See id. at Art. 5.
7 Id. at Art. 33.
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Aviation Administration issued Special Federal Aviation
Regulation No. 40 (SFAR 40).8 The operative provisions
of the regulation stated:
Section 1. [N]o person may land or takeoff any Model
DC-10 airplane within the United States, except as author-
ized under § 2 or otherwise authorized by the
Administrator.
Section 2. This regulation does not apply to a foreign
registered Model DC-10 airplane which, at the time this
regulation takes effect, is enroute to a place in the United
Sates or is at a place within the United States. These air-
planes may depart from the airport at which they are lo-
cated, or at which they arrive, for a place outside the
United States, using the most direct, feasible route, and
without passengers or cargo on board.9
This unilateral United States action was not calmly re-
ceived by several European carriers flying DC-10s. Legal
action was promptly brought in the United States seeking
vindication of the Article 33 reciprocal recognition rule.
The British Civil Aviation Authority took an interest in
this litigation, opposing the United States position as ami-
cus curiae. Later, a larger group of European carriers com-
menced a second action to recover money damages.
This paper discusses these two court cases brought in
the wake of SFAR 40 and attempts an analysis of Article
33 of the Chicago Convention. The paper begins by re-
counting the events leading up to the SFAR 40 dispute.
There follows a detailed look at the ensuing foreign car-
rier litigation. The paper next describes the background
behind Article 33 and the development of Annex 8 to the
Chicago Convention, which sets out the minimum airwor-
thiness standards. The latter part of the paper is devoted
to an examination of policy considerations that arise when
States find themselves in fundamental disagreement over
a safety issue but confronted by the mutual recognition
rule.
44 Fed. Reg. 33389 (1979).
9 Id.
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I. THE LITIGATION OVER SFAR 40
A. Factual Background
SFAR 40 was issued in the aftermath of the crash of a
McDonnell Douglas DC-10 at Chicago's O'Hare Interna-
tional Airport on May 25, 1979. The American Airlines
aircraft achieved a maximum altitude of 350 feet before
rolling sharply to the left and impacting some twenty-
seven seconds after liftoff.' The loss of life totalled 273,
including all 258 passengers, the 13 crew members, and 2
persons on the ground. In additon, two other persons on
the ground were injured."' The disaster was the worst in
United States aviation history, and, at the time, the fourth
worst ever. 12 The crash raised particular concern because
it appeared to involve the "inflight structural failure of a
turbo-prop or jet airliner [which] is a virtually unheard of
phenomenon." '
A massive investigation of the crash was immediately
undertaken by the National Transportation Safety Board.
Preliminary investigations revealed that there "could be
no contention of low level wind shear, vortex turbulence,
sabotage or any other outside cause."' 4 When all eye-wit-
ness accounts reported loss on takeoff of the engine at-
tached under the left wing 15 - observations consistent
with the post-crash location of the engine found rolled to
the left side of the runway' 6 - attention was directed to
It Kennelly, Litigation Implications of the Chicago O'Hare Airport Crash of American
Airlines Flight 191, 15J. MARSHALL L. REV. 273, 287 (1982). The factual informa-
tion in the Kennelly article is drawn from NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY
BOARD, AIRCRAFTI ACCIDENT REPORT: AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., DC-10-10,
NII00AA, CHICAGO-O'HARE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, MAY
25, 1979 (1979).
i Kennelly, supra note 10, at 273.
I d. at 274.
1. Id. at 287. Kennelly notes that it had been "almost 20 years since a similar
occurrence, when two Lockheed Electras suffered loss of wings during flight." See
id. at 287 n.75.
.4 Id. at 274.
', Id. at 284 n.55. The DC-10 is fitted with three engines, one under each wing
and one in the tail section. See id. at 283-85.
it; Id. at 286.
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the airworthiness of the aircraft itself. The subject of par-
ticular focus was the engine mount pylon assembly attach-
ing the engine to the wing. If failure of the pylon could be
attributed to improper maintenance, the concern would
be limited to those aircraft that had not been properly
maintained, 17 and inspections would reveal the extent of
the problem and the curative measures required. Imme-
diately following the crash, however, the possibility of a
defect in design, which would implicate the airworthiness
of all DC-10s, could not be ruled out.' 8
While it quickly became clear that failure of the pylon
mounting assembly had precipitated the crash,' 9 it was
not clear what had caused the pylon to fail. Given such
uncertainty in a matter so immediately connected to pub-
lic safety, the FAA took forceful precautionary meas-
ures.20  Emergency Airworthiness Directives were issued
on May 28 and May 29, 1979, requiring mandatory in-
spections of all DC-10s registered in the United States.2 '
The information contained in the airworthiness directives
was conveyed to foreign DC-10 operators as well.22 As
the inspections ordered under the airworthiness direc-
tives revealed evidence of further cracking in the pylons,
17 Id. at 274.
18 Id.
11 Id. at 285-86. Ultimately, the cause of the crash was fully explained by loss of
the left wing engine and supporting assembly, which severed the hydraulic wing
flap controls and electrical warning system as it broke away. The left wing flaps
retracted from takeoff position on their own, thus raising the airspeed necessary
to sustain lift. The crew responded properly to loss of engine power by slowing
airspeed but were unaware, due to loss of the warning system, of the increased
stall speed. When the left wing stalled, the plane banked radically down and left,
leading to impact. Id.; see also British Caledonian Airways Ltd. v. Bond, 665 F.2d
1153, 1155 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
2o British Caledonian, 665 F.2d at 1155.
21 Id. The effect of the airworthiness directives was to ground the aircraft in-
volved until the required measures were completed.
22 Id. Under Annex 8, part II, section 4.2.2 of the Chicago Convention, the
State of the manufacturer of an aircraft is required to transmit "mandatory contin-
uing airworthiness information" to any State which has advised the State of the
manufacturer that it has the aircraft entered on its registry. Note 1 advises that
"[a]mong such information is that issued by Contracting States in the form of
airworthiness directives." Chicago Convention, supra note 2, at Annex 8, pt. II,
§ 4.2.2 (7th ed. 1983).
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the FAA issued an Emergency Order of Suspension early
on the morning ofJune 6, 1979.23 This order "prohibited
the operation of all U.S.-registered Model DC-10 aircraft
by suspending the type certificate for all DC-10s and ter-
minating the effectiveness of the individual airworthiness
certificates for each U.S.-registered DC-10 aircraft."124
Recognizing that this order would not prohibit operation
of foreign-registered DC-10s in United States airspace,
the FAA also issued SFAR 40, effective at 6:00 p.m. the
same day.25
The European air carriers and aviation authorities re-
sponded swiftly to the DC-10 crisis. With Yugoslavia as
the lone exception,26 thirteen of the fourteen nations in
the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) with DC-
10s on their registers "provisionally suspended the indi-
vidual airworthiness certificates for each of their DC-10
aircraft. ' 27 Between June 14 and 18, 1979, the European
carriers and their counterpart national aviation authorities
met at Zurich and concluded a three-part inspection and
maintenance package to permit withdrawal of the provi-
sional suspensions. On June 19, the British Civil Aviation
Authority withdrew the provisional suspension, thereby
recertifying the British DC-10 fleet, but additionally is-
sued an airworthiness directive conditioning return to ser-
vice on adherence to the agreed upon inspection and
maintenance program.28 Within several days, the remain-
ing ECAC nations affected - except for Turkey, whose
recertification was anticipated shortly - had followed
suit.2 9
When SFAR 40 remained in effect to forbid European
2., See British Caledonian, 665 F.2d at 1155.
24 Id.
25 Id.
2 6 Brown, DC-JO Investigation: Europe Resumes DC-JO Service, Av. WK. & Sp. TECH.
June 25, 1979, at 31. Yugoslavia never rescinded certification of its DC-1Os. Id.
27 British Caledonian, 665 F.2d at 1156. The ECAC is comprised of a total of 21
nations. Id.
28 Id.
21, Brown, supra note 26, at 31.
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DC- 10 traffic to the United States, the reaction of the Eu-
ropean carriers and civil aviation authorities was predict-
able. The president of Swissair summed up their feelings
as follows: "The European authorities are not so likely to
automatically follow the FAA in the future .... They re-
ceived a heavy impact from the FAA grounding action and
they are likely to do something so as not to be so helpless
in the future .... We cannot jeopardize our operations
because of the U.S.'s political problems. ' 30 It was noted
that the British Civil Aviation Authority, which has a repu-
tation "for a cautious and conservative approach to air-
craft safety, voted unanimously to recertify all DC-10
aircraft on the British registry."'3 Further, none of the re-
maining ECAC members without DC-10s registered any
opposition to DC-10 operation in their airspace. 2
Delegates from the ECAC met with United States repre-
sentatives in Paris on June 25, 1979, to request rescission
of SFAR 40. The European delegation pointed to the
obligations of reciprocal recognition of airworthiness cer-
tificates under Article 33 of the Chicago Convention. 4
Their request, however, was refused. Just as at the earlier
Zurich meeting, the United States representatives offered
only the option of flight over the United States, and re-
fused landing privileges. 5 SFAR 40 remained in effect
until July 13, 1979, when it was rescinded by order of the
FAA.36
B. British Calendonian Airways Ltd. v. Bond
In British Caledonian Airways Ltd. v. Bond,3 7 four Euro-
pean carriers challenged the validity of SFAR 40 in the
.- Id. at 31-32.
.1Id.
12 Id. at 31.
,,, British Caledonian, 665 F.2d at 1156.
4 Id.
, Brown, supra note 26, at 32.
-i Termination of Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 40, 44 Fed. Reg.
42,170 (1979).
37 665 F.2d 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The named respondent was Langhorne
Bond, Administrator of the FAA.
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District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals.3 8 The peti-
tioners sought an order setting aside SFAR 40.39 They
alleged that the regulation violated Article 33 of the Chi-
cago Convention calling for reciprocal recognition of na-
tional certificates of airworthiness issued by the
contracting States. 40 Article 33 reads:
Article 33. Recognition of Certificates and Licenses
Certificates of airworthiness and certificates of compe-
tency and licenses issued or rendered valid by the con-
tracting State in which the aircraft is registered, shall be
recognized as valid by the other contracting States, pro-
vided that the requirements under which such certificates
or licenses were issued or rendered valid are equal to or
above the minimum standards which may be established
from time to time pursuant to this Convention.4'
There was disagreement as to whether the Chicago Con-
vention was in force between all nations involved.4 2 The
petitioners maintained that violation of Article 33 in turn
violated section 1102 of the Federal Aviation Act of
1958.43 Section 1102 instructed the Administrator in car-
rying out his duties to "do so consistently with any obliga-
tion assumed by the United States in any treaty,
convention, or agreement that may be in force between
the United States and any foreign country or foreign
-, In addition to British Caledonian, the petitioners were Lufthansa, Swissair
and Balair. Id. at 1156. Alitalia appeared as an intervenor. Northwest Airlines
appeared as amicus curiae in support of the foreign airlines. Id. at 1157.
- Id. at 1156-57.
40 Id. at 1156.
41 Chicago Convention, supra note 2, at Art. 33.
4 Fifty-two nations met in Chicago to conclude the Convention on Interna-
tional Civil Aviation. The Convention was signed and opened for signature on
December 7, 1944, to come into force 30 days after the filing of the 26th instru-
ment of ratification. The United States ratified the Chicago Convention on July
25, 1946, and filed on October 9, 1946. The Chicago Convention came into force
on April 4, 1947. Today, more 150 than nations have ratified or adhered to the
Chicago Convention. See K. POWER, supra note 3, at 3; see also PUBLIC INFORMATION
OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION, THE CONVENTION ON IN-
TERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION, THE FIRST 40 YEARS 3 (Jan. 1984).
41 Id. at 1154.
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countries."4 4
The FAA challenged the jurisdiction of the court and
launched a full defense against the alleged violations. As
to jurisdiction, the government challenged justiciability of
the dispute on three threshold grounds, two of which
were closely connected.45 The government argued that
the case was moot, that Article 33 was a non-self-execut-
ing provision, and that in any event the issues raised
presented political questions. 6
The District of Columbia Circuit rejected each argu-
ment in turn. As to mootness, the government contended
that the case was moot because SFAR 40 had been re-
scinded long before the issue reached court. The court
applied the two-part mootness test set forth in Weinstein v.
Bradford.47 In Weinstein, the United States Supreme Court
devised an exception to the mootness doctrine where "(1)
the challenged action was in its duration too short to be
fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2)
there was a reasonable expectation that the same com-
plaining party would be subjected to the same action
again."' 48 In finding that the case was not moot under this
test, the British Caledonian court stated:
[I]t is not so unusual for the aviation authorities to be at
first uncertain as to the precise cause of a crash. As long
as the FAA Administrator asserts that he has the legal au-
thority, under such circumstances, to disregard valid air-
worthiness certificates issued by nations with whom the
United States has entered into binding aviation agree-
ments, these nations reasonably can expect to be sub-
jected to the same action at some time in the future.4 9
The government next maintained that the petitioner
foreign carriers could not seek judicial remedy because
44 49 U.S.C. § 1502(a) (1982). Section 1502 replaces section 1102, which was
repealed by Pub. L. 91-258, title 1, section 52(a) May 21, 1970.
4., British Caledonian, 665 F.2d at 1157.
4' Id.
47 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975).
4, Id. at 149 (cited in British Caledonian, 665 F.2d at 1158).
4,, British Caledonian, 665 F.2d at 1158.
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Article 33 of the Chicago Convention and additional bilat-
eral treaties relied upon by the petitioners5 were non-
self-executing and thus conferred no rights on private
parties such as the airlines.5 ' The government argued that
the remedy for any breach which might have occurred
would be a matter for diplomatic resolution between na-
tions, not by private litigants.52 The court stated that
whether Article 33 was to be regarded as self-executing
must be determined by the intention of the signatories to
the Chicago Convention. This intention, in turn, was to
be determined from the language of the agreement or,
where ambiguous, the negotiating history. 53 After quot-
ing the language of Article 33, the court stated, "Thus,
under Article 33, the judgment of the country of registry
that an aircraft is airworthy must be respected, unless the
country of registry is not observing the 'minimum stan-
dards.' -154 The court compared Article 33 to various
other Chicago Convention provisions, some self-execut-
ing, some not, and noted that under the terms of the Chi-
cago Convention it was not the individual nations but
ICAO which was to adopt the minimum standards.5 5 The
court concluded that Article 33 was self-executing. 56
Related to the non-self-executing argument was the
FAA position that determining the issue of compliance
with the treaty provisions would necessarily entangle the
court in political questions which it was ill-suited to an-
- Id. at 1159. The court stated that the additional reliance placed on bilateral
agreements "does not affect our analysis of the legality of SFAR 40." Id. at 1159
n.3. The court declined to enter into close analysis of the bilateral agreements,
focusing instead on the alleged Article 33 violation. Id. at 1160. This paper also
adopts that approach.
.i, Id. at 1159.
.12 Id. at 1159-60.
- Id. at 1160.
.4 Id.
- Id. at 1160-61. The court noted that Article 37 of the Chicago Convention
obligates ICAO to adopt international airworthiness standards. See id. at 1160 n.5.
The airworthiness standards adopted by ICAO pursuant to Article 37 are set forth
in Annex 8 to the Chicago Convention.
,- British Caledonian, 665 F.2d at 1161.
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swer or which were reserved to the executive branch.57
The court rejected the suggestion that in addressing this
case it would place itself in the position of determining
foreign carrier compliance with minimum standards, find-
ing instead that its only duty was "to determine whether
the FAA Administrator acted consistently with and fol-
lowed the procedures mandated by the various interna-
tional agreements. ' 8 This was strictly a legal question.
The court stated that "failure to observe the minimum
safety standards in issuing airworthiness certificates is the
only ground on which one country may question the air-
worthiness judgment of the country of registry. ' 59 Noting
that the Administrator had not questioned compliance
with minimum standards,60 the court viewed itself "faced
with the purely legal issue of whether an administrative
order . . . comported with applicable treaty require-
ments."' 61 In denying the justiciability challenge on all
counts, the court concluded, that it had jurisdiction to ad-
dress the issues raised by SFAR 40.62
At this juncture, the court ventured the following view
of the legality of SFAR 40 under both international and
domestic law:
Because the Administrator at no time questioned whether
the foreign governments met with the minimum safety
standards set by the ICAO, his issuance of SFAR 40 and
his refusal to rescind the order after the foreign govern-
ments had revalidated the airworthiness certificates for
-7 Id. at 1161. The FAA contended that there were no judicially discernable
and manageable standards from which a court could determine whether the mini-
mum safety provisions of relevant international agreements had been imple-
mented. Id.
5I Id. at 1161-62.
Id. at 1162.
' The court stated that "[a]t oral argument, government counsel conceded in
response to a direct inquiry that the FAA did not question that the foreign gov-
ernments had met the minimum safety standards. Rather, the government
claimed to have 'reserved' that position as a fall-back .... Id. at 1162 n.8. The
court refused to accept this position, stating "[W]e cannot ... abandon our re-
fusal to accept post-hoc rationalizations for administrative actions." Id.
- Id. at 1162.
62 Id.
19891
732 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [54
aircraft flying under their flags would appear to have vio-
lated Article 33 and, therefore, Section 1102.63
Nonetheless, the FAA presented four arguments to sup-
port the legality of the regulation. 64 First, the FAA ar-
gued that Article 9(b) of the Chicago Convention itself
constituted an exception to the Article 33 reciprocal rec-
ognition obligation.65 Article 9(b) provides:
Each contracting State reserves also the right, in excep-
tional circumstances or during a period of emergency, or
in the interest of public safety, and with immediate effect,
temporarily to restrict or prohibit flying over the whole or
any part of its territory, on condition that such restriction
or prohibition shall be applicable without distinction of
nationality to aircraft of all other States.66
The FAA argued that the exceptional circumstances of the
DC-10 crash had created an emergency for public safety
justifying a restriction on DC-10 flight over the whole of
the United States.67 But after reviewing Article 9 in its
entirety to place subpart (b) in context, and observing
that Article 9 appeared in Chapter II entitled "Flight Over
Territory of Contracting States," while Article 33 was to
be found in Chapter V entitled "Conditions to be Fulfilled
With Respect to Aircraft," the court rejected the FAA in-
terpretation for failing to reflect the "true meaning" of
Article 9(b). 68 The court's own interpretation was suc-
cinctly expressed:
We think Article 9 is aimed at restricting the territorial ac-
cess of all aircraft, rather than at restricting the move-
ments of particular types of aircraft .... In short, Article 9
permits a country to safeguard its airspace when entry by
all aircraft would be dangerous or intrusive because of
conditions on the ground. Article 9 does not allow one
country to ban landing and take-off because of doubts
, Id. at 1162-63.
1w Id. at 1163.
' Id.
' Chicago Convention, supra note 2, at Art. 9(b).
, British Caledonian, 665 F.2d at 1163.
'I /d.
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about the air-worthiness of particular foreign aircraft, in
derogation of Article 33.69
Second, the FAA contended that certain provisions of
the bilateral aviation agreements 70 permitted the SFAR 40
action. The court agreed that the provisions of these
agreements could permit immediate unilateral action on
airworthiness grounds. 7' This defense was unavailable on
the facts, however, because none of the justifications
spelled out in the agreements for taking such action were
"identified or relied on by the Administrator when he is-
sued SFAR 40 or when he refused to recognize the for-
eign airlines' revalidated certificates of airworthiness. 72
The third FAA contention was that validity of the for-
eign national airworthiness certificates rested on the
United States type certificate 73 for the DC-10 aircraft.
The United States had provided the original type certifi-
cate for the McDonnell-Douglas DC-10. 74  The FAA ar-
gued that when the type certificate was temporarily
suspended under the June 6, 1979, Emergency Order,
there was no underlying airworthiness design certificate
on which the foreign nations could base individual DC-10
airworthiness certificates.75 This, the FAA said, permitted
the government to deny recognition to the foreign airwor-
wId.
M Bilateral aviation agreements were in place between the United States and
the governments of each of the petitioners. See id. at 1159 n.3. These agreements
contained additional clauses permitting immediate action by a party under speci-
fied circumstances related to airworthiness. Id.
71 Id. at 1164.
72 Id.
7.- The FAA controls issuance of domestic airworthiness certificates in a three-
stage process under 49 U.S.C. § 1423. The first stage grants a type certificate for
the design of the aircraft. See 49 U.S.C. § 1423(a)0(1982). The second stage grants
a production certificate to permit duplicates of the type design. See id. § 1423(b).
The final stage is the airworthiness certificate itself for each individual aircraft. Id.
§ 1423(c). While the individual airworthiness certificates will be concerned with
such matters as proper maintenance and absence of damage to the aircraft it must
also be supported by the underpinning type certificate. Id.
74 Type Certificate No. 422WE for the DC-10 aircraft was issued by the FAA on
July 29, 1971. Construction of the aircraft involved in the Chicago crash was com-
pleted on October 29, 1971. See Kennelly, supra note 10, at 283 n.50.
7.- British Caledonian, 665 F.2d at 1164.
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thiness certificates, thus justifying SFAR 40.76
The court found this argument unpersuasive. 77 It
noted the permissive nature of Annex 8, which provided
in relevant part that "[t]he new State of Registry, when
issuing another Certificate of Airworthiness or rendering
the original certificate valid, may consider prior issuance
of the Certificate of Airworthiness by a Contracting State
as satisfactory evidence, in whole or in part, that the air-
craft is airworthy .... Without ruling on the specific
issue raised by the FAA as to what would occur if the State
of registry had relied entirely on a foreign (i.e., United
States) type certificate subsequently suspended, the court
held that the record did not disclose exclusive reliance on
the United States DC-10 type certificate. 79 The court
pointed out the evidence to the contrary:
Indeed, the British Civil Aviation Authority expressly
stated that in reissuing its certificates of airworthiness, it
"took account of FAA type certification as a useful basis,"
but called for additional substantiation in a number of ar-
eas, including fail safe and fatigue and made use of Doug-
las fatigue test information not required by FAA in their
evaluation. 80
More generally, the court reached the important conclu-
sion that "the multilateral and bilateral agreements intend
the States of registry to resolve questions of safety and
continuing airworthiness that may arise after the original
airworthiness and type certificates were issued." 8 1
The final FAA argument raised a number of provisions
of the Federal Aviation Act related to control of airspace,
public safety, and the issuance of airworthiness certifi-
cates, which the FAA contended took priority over the
76 Id.
77 Id. at 1164-65.
79 INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION, INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS,
AIRWORTHINESS OF AIRCRAFT, ANNEX 8 TO THE CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL
CIVIL AVIATION, pt. II, § 3.2 (7th ed. 1983) [hereinafter Annex 8].




section 1102 duty. 2 The court felt that all sections relied
upon except one had "no relation to airworthiness deci-
sions but simply define general functions of the Adminis-
trator. As to the remaining section granting authority
to issue airworthiness certificates, the court found that its
application was limited to United States flag aircraft.
4
Noting that the Chicago Convention mutual recognition
system had been in place for more than ten years prior to
enactment of the Federal Aviation Act in 1958, the court
concluded, "We believe that in section 1502 [§ 1102 in
the 1958 Act] Congress commanded the Administrator to
respect that system, and we reject the suggestion that
Congress granted the Administrator the authority to over-
ride section 1502 by invoking the generalized language of
other sections of the Act."8 5
In a lucid, well-reasoned opinion which respects the in-
ternational law regime established under the Chicago
Convention for the international control of airworthiness
of aircraft, the District of Columbia Circuit "set aside" the
action of the FAA Administrator in issuing SFAR 40.86
The court gave direct meaning to the clear language of
Article 33, finding that it requires that the aviation author-
ity of each member State respect the airworthiness judg-
ment of other member States, provided the minimum
standards of Annex 8 are met. In failing to do so, the
court found, SFAR 40 violated both international law
under Article 33 and United States domestic law ex-
pressed in section 1102.87
82 See id. at 1165-68.
" Id. at 1166.
84 Id. at 1168.
- Id.
", Id. There is reason for some concern over the conclusion of the court that
Article 33 is self-executing, a ruling which may have been necessary to grant relief
to the private party petitioners, but which may also hold implications for the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity. See Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
761 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1985). Further discussion of the sovereign immunity issue
appears at infra note 105.
87 See id. at 1162-63, 1168.
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C. Balair Ltd. v. United States of America
As one basis for refusing to find the case moot, the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit in British Caledonian" noted that
the foreign airlines intended "to take any judgment in
their favor to the Court of Claims in an attempt to recover
money damages."' 9 Because the circuit court had exclu-
sive jurisdiction to review the legality of the FAA SFAR 40
action, the circuit judges reasoned it necessary to rule on
the case so that the airlines could determine whether their
damages claims could be pressed.90
In Balair v. United States,9' ten European carriers fol-
lowed up the success in British Caledonian by claiming dam-
ages not in the Court of Claims,92 but in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia. The total
damages claimed exceeded $100 million.93 The plaintiffs
based their argument for jurisdiction exclusively on fed-
eral question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. section 1331
and the Alien Tort Statute set forth at 28 U.S.C. section
1350. 9" The government moved to dismiss, alleging lack
of subject-matter jurisdiction. 95 The government con-
tended that only an express waiver of sovereign immunity
could expose the United States to an award of money
damages and that no such waiver was contained in the
Chicago Convention, the bilateral agreements or the ju-
risdictional legislation relied on by the plaintiffs. 96 After
"" Id. at 1153.
- Id. at 1158 n.2.
Id.
18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,692 (D.C.D.C. 1984), aff'd, 767 F.2d 137 (D.C. Cir.)
(no opinion), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 902 (1985).
w2 The foreign carriers may have been alerted to jurisdictional problems with
the Court of Claims by the District of Columbia Circuit, which had noted that "the
Court of Claims is expressly prohibited by statute from entertaining actions based
on or inextricably bound up with alleged violations or [sic] international agree-
ments." British Caledonian, 665 F.2d at 1158 n.2.
wl Balair, 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) at 17,693.
1,4 Id. The district court noted that plaintiffs "expressly disclaim reliance on
either ... the Tucker Act or ... the Federal Torts Claims Act, as bases for ...




reviewing several cases,97 the district court agreed that
waiver of United States governmental immunity must be
express, concluding that "unless an express waiver of sov-
ereign immunity to suit for damages can be found in
either 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 or 1350 or the Agreements al-
luded to above, this Court does not have jurisdiction to
entertain plaintiffs' suit." 98
Concerning federal question jurisdiction, the court
stated that absent some other provision explicitly waiving
immunity, the "courts have consistently held that section
1331 does not waive the federal government's sovereign
immunity to suit." 99 A similar conclusion was reached
under the section 1350 Alien Tort Statute. The court
stated, "Like section 1331, this section does not contain
an explicit waiver of the government's sovereign immu-
nity."' 00 In this regard, the Balair court viewed the 1980
decision of the District of Columbia Circuit in Canadian
Transport Co. v. United States 10' as controlling. In Canadian
Transport, the circuit court ruled that adoption of the
treaty itself did not constitute a waiver of immunity.10 2
The District of Columbia Circuit stated that "[i]n the ab-
sence of specific language in the treaty waiving the sover-
eign immunity of the United States, the treaty must be
interpreted in accord with the rule that treaty violations
are normally to be redressed outside the courtroom."'10 3
The Balair court found no specific language in the Chi-
cago Convention or the bilateral agreements whereby the
97 Id. A flavor of the law cited by the district court may be had from United
States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980), (quoting United States v. King, 395
U.S. 1, 4 (1969), "[a] waiver of sovereign immunity 'cannot be implied but must
be unequivocally expressed.' ")
Balair, 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) at 17,693.
0' Id.
I00 d.
.. 663 F.2d 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
' Id. at 1092. The treaty at issue in Canadian Transport afforded to the plaintiff
"secure passage into ports and rivers in the United States." Id. The action for
damages arose when the plaintiff's vessel was denied entry to the port at Norfolk,
Virginia, by the United States Coast Guard. Id.
,,,. Canadian Transp., 663 F.2d at 1092, (cited in Balair, 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) at
17,694).
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United States had waived immunity. Accordingly, the
government's motion to dismiss for want of subject-mat-
ter jurisdiction was granted. 04
While this paper will not attempt a detailed analysis of
the reasoning of the district court in Balair, it is suggested
that the result is probably correct. Through the Adminis-
trator of the FAA, the United States had taken actions
subsequently held by the District of Columbia Circuit to
violate international treaty law. These actions, however,
were directed in territorial scope exclusively to areas
within United States sovereignty, though their effects may
have been felt elsewhere. In essence, the issuance of
SFAR 40 was a sovereign act which, if authorized by a for-
eign nation, would probably go unquestioned by United
States courts under the Act of State Doctrine." 5
104 Balair, 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) at 17,694.
, The decision of the district court is couched in terms of sovereign immunity.
In deciding questions of sovereign immunity applicable to foreign states, how-
ever, the district courts apply the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28
U.S.C. sections 1602-11 (1982) . Additionally, the United States traditionally as-
serts sovereign immunity in foreign courts on the same basis as contained in the
FSIA. When it is realized that section 1605(a)(1) vitiates immunity where "the
foreign state has waived its immunity either explicitly or by implication," the ques-
tion arises as to why, as a matter of policy, United States courts should grant
greater immunity to the United States sovereign (specific waiver only) than to for-
eign sovereigns. Or, stated differently, why should the United States sovereign
enjoy greater immunity in its own courts than it enjoys in foreign courts?
These questions are not raised as a challenge to the reasoning of the Balair
court, since it is accepted that Balair accurately sets out the law on United States
sovereign immunity in United States courts. These questions are instead directed
to the apparent disparity in United States law which permits the United States, but
not foreign sovereigns, to escape the effects of implied waiver. To eliminate this
disparity, the Balair court would be required to search also for an implied waiver
by the United States. Bearing in mind the circuit court holding in British
Calendonian that Article 33 was self-executing, an affirmative conclusion on im-
plied waiver might have been difficult to avoid. The suggestion in the text, how-
ever, is that the disparity of treatment may be justified by the Act of State
Doctrine, a principle applied in United States (and some foreign) courts which
leaves to the executive branch the proper response to certain foreign sovereign
acts, even in circumstances where sovereign immunity would not bar adjudication.
See Callejo v. Bancomer, 764 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1985), for a discussion of the
Act of State Doctrine in such circumstances; see also Kirgis, Understanding the Act of
State Doctrine's Effect, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 58 (1988).
The breach of international law found by the British Caledonian court also raises
the question of what the outcome of Balair might have been had it followed the
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II. INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE CHICAGO
CONVENTION
In British Caledonian the District of Columbia Circuit
Court determined, essentially through elucidating the
true scope and meaning of Article 33, that SFAR 40 vio-
lated international law. 10 6 The various defenses claimed
by the FAA to permit exceptions to the article were each
found wanting by the court.10 7  The legal obligations
under Article 33 extended to, and remained unqualified
by, the emergency circumstances present shortly after the
DC-10 crash.10 8 In large measure, the court drew its in-
terpretation from the language of the article itself. This
section will look behind that language and examine Arti-
cle 33 in closer detail.
Before embarking on this discussion, it will be helpful
to outline the complexities which have crept into the con-
cept of airworthiness since the adoption of the Chicago
Convention. The issue of mutual recognition of certifi-
cates of airworthiness may arise in two distinct contexts.
The first involves the original certificate of airworthiness
which may be required for export or import of aircraft.
The second relates to certification of airworthiness for
purposes of international air navigation. While mutual
recognition of airworthiness certificates would be a great
convenience in both contexts,'09 the dynamics urging in-
recent Second Circuit decision in Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic,
830 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1987), cert.granted, 108 S. Ct. 1466 (1988). In Hess, the
Second Circuit found that the Alien Tort Statute conferred jurisdiction against a
sovereign independently of the FSIA for torts alleging a breach of international
law. The answer again may lie in the Act of State Doctrine, which bars judicial
inquiry only for acts within the territory of the sovereign. The acts addressed in
Hess occurred on the high seas, while the United States act of implementing SFAR
40 was confined to its own borders.
.... British Caledonian, 665 F.2d at 1162-68.
107 Id.
10 Id.
I - The litigation spawned by SFAR 40 illustrates the disruption caused by lack
of mutual recognition in the air navigation context. In the context of airworthi-
ness for export, see Note, International Aviation Law: Bilateral Airworthiness Agreements
for Export and Import of Aircraft and Aeronautical Products, 9 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J.
303, 306 n.4 (1985) (BAAs [bilateral aviation agreements] for export are designed
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ternational cooperation may differ significantly when one
nation is seeking to sell an aircraft to another, as opposed
to looking to navigate aircraft in another State. As will be
seen, Article 33, at least in its present scope as developed
by ICAO, does not extend to the export/import
context. "10
Further, there are three types of international agree-
ments which raise the airworthiness issue: (1) Article 33 of
the multilateral Chicago Convention,' (2) bilateral avia-
tion agreements (BAAs) which deal with commercial mat-
ters such as flight route allocation but which also include
provisions on recognition of airworthiness certificates for
navigation purposes, 112  and (3) BAAs for ex-
port/import."t 3  With regard to airworthiness, types (1)
and (2) are directed solely to air navigation, although
there is nothing in the language of the airworthiness
clauses to confirm that the export/import context is ex-
cluded. The airworthiness clause typically used in type
to reduce the repetitive certification processes which cause an undue burden on
the international aviation community).
-, There are several bases on which to reasonably distinguish the need for mu-
tual recognition in the export/import context from that in the air navigation con-
text. First, an exporting State which oversees the manufacture of aircraft or an
importing State which will be asked to enter the aircraft on its own registry may
sensibly demand more exacting compliance with its own standards. Second, the
failure of reciprocal recognition of airworthiness for export/import purposes may
impede commercial activity in the purchase and sale of aircraft, but it does not
raise the same insurmountable problems with respect to operation of the interna-
tional civil aviation system as does refusal to recognize airworthiness certificates
for purposes of air navigation. If an export transaction is held up, time is available
to comply with the foreign airworthiness requirements or to reach bilateral accord
on mutual recognition. The system of international air transport will not grind to
a halt in the meantime. For these reasons, the FAA expresses the view that "while
the Annex 8 standards are adequate in establishing minimum international stan-
dards to assure freedom of air transport, these standards alone are not considered
adequate for United States export/import airworthiness certification." See Note,
supra note 109, at 323 n.84 (citing interview with FAA Director of Office of
Airworthiness).
I See Chicago Convention, supra note 2.
1"2 Portions of the standard form used by the United States for this type of BAA
are set out in British Caledonian, 665 F.2d at 1164.
111 The standard United States form for this type of agreement is reproduced at
3 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) 26,411 (1974).
THE CHICAGO CONVENTION
(3) mirrors the Article 33 language," 4 although these
agreements are intended to deal only with airworthiness
for export. Because airworthiness clauses in the export
agreements may be identical to Article 33, but the unqual-
ified reciprocal recognition rule does not apply with equal
force in the export context, it may be mistakenly thought
that rule has also been diluted for air navigation under
Article 33. It is important to bear these distinctions in
purpose in mind when evaluating the scope of Article 33.
A. The History and Development of Article 33
Article 33 has its genesis in the American draft
presented to the Chicago Convention. Article 20(c) of the
American draft provided: "Certificates of airworthiness
• . . issued or rendered valid by the Contracting State
whose nationality the aircraft possesses, shall be recog-
nized as valid by the other Contracting States,"'"1 5 pro-
vided minimum standards to be set by the ICAO Council
were met. With minor drafting changes, this provision
was adopted as Article 33.I16
It appears that the original aims of the authors of the
Chicago Convention as to airworthiness standards were
ambitious. In keeping with the goals of uniformity and
standardization sought by the Chicago Convention as a
whole - goals intended to promote the safety of interna-
tional civil aviation - the drafters envisioned a detailed
international code for the airworthiness of aircraft. Under
the direction of an international airworthiness bureau, it
was felt such a code would "ultimately render unneces-
sary any reference to the several differing national codes
to meet the requirements of international air navigation
114 See Note, supra note 109, at 323 n.83 (in most BAAs in effect between the
United States and foreign States, the reciprocal recognition rule expressed in Ar-
ticle 33 of the Chicago Convention is generally reproduced).
I"-' I PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION CONFERENCE OF 1944
561 (1948) [hereinafter PROCEEDINGS] (a two-volume set published by the Depart-
ment of State).
,; See 2 PROCEEDINGS at 1385-86.
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and the export of aircraft." '" 7
However, the enormity of such an undertaking, particu-
larly in light of the rapid technical advances in the field,
soon got the better of ICAO. While ICAO had a mandate
under Article 37 to publish minimum international air-
worthiness standards, in 1956 ICAO abandoned the con-
cept of a detailed international code. The decision was
made instead that Annex 8 should include "broad Stan-
dards which defined, for application by the competent na-
tional authorities, the complete minimum international
basis for the recognition by States of certificates of airwor-
thinessfor the purpose of the flight of aircraft of other states into
or over their territories.'" 18 Each State was under an obliga-
tion to "establish its own comprehensive and detailed
code of airworthiness, or ... select a comprehensive and
detailed code established by another Contracting
State.""' 9 Each national code was required to comply
with the broad Annex 8 standards.12 0
In 1957, an Airworthiness Committee was formed
under the direction of the Air Navigation Commission to
monitor national code compliance.' 2' The Airworthiness
Committee's enforcement criterion forbade national stan-
dards which were "appreciably lower" than those permit-
ted by Annex 8. Following further modification of
doctrine in the early 1970s, ICAO dropped this specific
standard for compliance. On March 15, 1972, ICAO pub-
lished the current airworthiness policy containing the fol-
lowing provisions:12 2
c) international airworthiness Standards adopted by the
Council are recognized as being the complete interna-
" PROCEEDINGS at 706.
"' Annex 8, supra note 78, at 5 (emphasis added).
Id.
120 Id.
1' Id. The Air Navigation Commission is one of five permanent "Secretariats"
established by the Chicago Convention. The others are the Air Transport Bu-
reau, the Technical Assistance Bureau, the Legal Bureau and the Bureau of Ad-
ministration and Services. See Chicago Convention, supra note 2.
' The entire 1972 policy statement is relevant but too lengthy for full quota-
tion. See Annex 8, supra note 78, at 6.
THE CHICAGO CONVENTION
tional code necessary to bring into force and effect the
rights and obligations which arise under article 33 of the
Convention;
d) the technical airworthiness Standards in Annex 8
shall be presented as broad specifications stating the
objectives rather than the means of realizing these objec-
tives; ICAO recognizes that national codes of airworthi-
ness containing the full scope and extent of detail
considered necessary by individual States are required as
the basis for the certification by individual States of air-
worthiness of each aircraft....
These developments illustrate two significant changes
to the ICAO efforts to regulate airworthiness which had
followed the adoption of Article 33. First, ICAO had
abandoned efforts to formulate a detailed international
code, relying instead on "comprehensive and detailed na-
tional airworthiness codes" which were to meet the gener-
alized objectives of Annex 8. Second, while it appears
that a role in certifying airworthiness of aircraft for export
was initially contemplated, 124 ICAO had ultimately limited
its role to air navigation, leaving export/import to be
dealt with in bilateral agreements.
It has been argued to the contrary that Article 33 was
never intended to cover certificates of airworthiness for
export, but only air navigation. The following passage is
relied upon by one commentator in support of this view:
The Council concluded that the advantages that would ac-
crue from the establishment, in lieu of bilateral agree-
ments, of a standard procedure, whereby the certificate of
an aircraft complying with the applicable ICAO Standards
would be unconditionally validated or renewed by the im-
porting State, would not be sufficient to justify prejudicing
the development of Annex 8 to serve its primary purpose
1'23 Id.
124 See 1 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 115, at 706. In addition to the suggestion that
the international code might ultimately obviate the need for national codes for
"the export of aircraft", see supra text accompanying note 117, the Proceedings
from the Convention also state that the drafters were concerned not to "jeopard-
ize the products of one of the world's great manufacturing industries." See 1 PRO-
CEEDINGS, supra note 115, at 706.
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as a means of implementing Articles 33 and 37 of the
Convention 1 25
Whatever may have been the original intent, Article 33
is clearly not now intended to cover the issue of airworthi-
ness for export/import. Numerous bilateral aviation
agreements have come to occupy this field.' 26 Whether
this occurred as a matter of original intent, or as a result
of ICAO abandoning a detailed international code in the
mid-1950s, however, really does not matter in the context
of SFAR 40. Rights of air navigation, not export/import
privileges, were under attack by SFAR 40. On the issue of
air navigation, there is no doubt that Article 33 was in-
tended to control.
Brief comment should be made concerning the com-
mercial Bilateral Aviation Agreements which also address
the airworthiness for navigation issue. It was this form of
BAA which was raised by the petitioners and dealt with by
the District of Columbia Circuit in British Caledonian.12 7
From the reasons given by the court, it may be inferred
that the mutual airworthiness recognition rules of these
agreements may supplement or supplant the Article 33
obligations, 28 although in issuing SFAR 40 these agree-
ments had not been complied with either. While such a
bilateral approach could frustrate the aspirations of the
Chicago Convention for a uniform, universal system, it
seems proper that two nations must be permitted to
amend their obligations inter se if both desire to do so.
The true intent of Article 33 has also been explored by
examining in aviation conventions leading up to the Chi-
-1 Richard, The DC-10 Chicago Crash and the Legality of SFAR 40, 6 ANNALS OF AIR
& SPACE L. 195, 199 (1981) (citing G.F. FITZGERALD, THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL
ORGANIZATION - A CASE STUDY IN THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL OR-
GANIZATION, 6869-11, 19 (1968)).
.... See Note, supra note 109, at 303 n.l (listing 24 such agreements to which the
United States is a party).
,.7 See British Caledonian, 665 F.2d at 1164.
128 The circuit court agreed that the provisions in such agreements "[allow] the
United States to take immediate action, without consultations, if such action is
necessary to prevent further non-compliance... with the applicable airworthiness
standards .... " Id.
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cago Convention. In the Paris Convention of 1919, a pro-
vision on mutual recognition much like Article 33 was
included. The Havana Convention of 1928, however,
contained a provision permitting refusal to recognize for-
eign airworthiness certificates if domestic airworthiness
standards were not met. One commentator concludes
that given a precedent for both approaches, "[t]he draft-
ers of the Chicago Convention deliberately chose to adopt
the model ... of the Paris Convention. Article 33 repro-
duces the unqualified recognition principal."1 29
B. A Close Look at Annex 8
Annex 8 warrants careful attention both because it sets
forth the minimum airworthiness standards and because
its language strongly suggests it is the State of registry
which is to have the final say on airworthiness determina-
tion. Part II of Annex 8 dealing with administrative mat-
ters is particularly important. 30  As to airworthiness
certificates generally, subsection 2.2 provides in part:
2.2. A Contracting State shall not issue or render valid a
Certificate of Airworthiness for which it intends to claim
recognition pursuant to Article 33 of the Convention on
International Civil Aviation, unless the aircraft complies
with a comprehensive and detailed national airworthiness
code established for that class of aircraft by the State of
Registry or by any other Contracting State. 3 1
This provision indicates the State of registry may, under
its own or an adopted national airworthiness code, issue a
certificate for which it claims Article 33 recognition.
121, Richard, supra note 125, at 197. Richard cites the Balair brief in British Cale-
donian: "The reciprocal recognition rule stated in [the Paris Convention] was un-
qualified as to certificates of airworthiness, but explicitly qualified as to certificates
of pilot competency - a distinction carried forward in the respective articles of
the Chicago Convention (Article 33 as contrasted with Article 32)." See id. at 197
n.3.
,o Annex 8 was amended in 1982 to add a provision dealing with exchange of
information on faults, malfunctions and defects in aircraft. This provision ap-
pears at subsection 4.2.4. The provisions of section 4 are otherwise unchanged
from those in place during the currency of SFAR 40 in 1979.
- , Annex 8, supra note 78, § 2.2.
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Concerning continuing airworthiness, such as was at is-
sue in the DC-10 incident, subsection 4.1 states, "The
continuing airworthiness of an aircraft shall be deter-
mined by the State of Registry .... Subsection 4.2
provides for the mutual exchange of "mandatory continu-
ing airworthiness information" between the State of man-
ufacture and the State of registry, but adds in a note that
"[t]he Contracting State which has an aircraft entered on
its register is responsible for taking whatever action it
deems necessary upon receipt of mandatory continuing
airworthiness information." 133 These provisions clearly
express that the State of registry is to make the final deci-
sions regarding continuing airworthiness. 134
The obligations to exchange ongoing airworthiness in-
formation have also been argued to indicate limits to the
obligations of the State of manufacture.13 1 In evaluating
these obligations, it has been stated that the sole duty of
the State of manufacture under Annex 8 is "to communi-
cate all relevant airworthiness information to the State of
Import with a view to allowing the latter to make enlight-
ened judgments in the exercise of its responsibility."' 3 6
In essence, Article 33 does not contemplate separate
type certificates and individual aircraft certificates, nor
distinct airworthiness assessments related to each. Judg-
ment on airworthiness as a whole, both as to the individ-
ual aircraft and as to the adequacy of the underlying type
design, is left to the State of registry. While "the new
State of Registry may, at its discretion, consider prior is-
suance of the certificate of airworthiness by a contracting
State as satisfactory evidence of airworthiness . . . [t]he
responsibility for such airworthiness determination ... is
entirely its own."'13 This view of the limited nature of the
' Id. § 4.1.
Id. § 4.2.2, Note 2.
1.4 For further discussion of these provisions of Annex 8, see Richard, supra
note 125, at 198-201.
, Id. at 200.
,so Id. at 202.
1-17 Id. at 200.
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responsibility for airworthiness of the State of manufac-
ture has been supported by foreign aviation authorities." 8
Relying on Annex 8 and detailed national codes to set ad-
equate standards for air navigation, including those cir-
cumstances where a State of manufacture is asked to
receive its own exported aircraft, "[t]he [ICAO] Council
has urged Contracting States not to impose on visiting
aeroplanes operational requirements other than those es-
tablished by the State of Registry, provided those require-
ments are not lower than the standards of [part of Annex
6] and 2.2 of Part III of this edition of Annex 8."'I39
C. International Safety Disputes and the Reciprocal
Recognition Rule
The fundamental issue in British Caledonian 140 was who
should have the final say on questions of airworthiness.
Should it be the State in whose territory the aircraft will
operate, which has a paramount interest in the safety of its
own citizens? Or should it be the State of registry for the
aircraft, a choice which would foster the smooth operation
of international civil aviation? SFAR 40 asserted that the
first principle should prevail; the obligations agreed to
under Article 33 sought to promote the second. This sec-
tion looks beyond the international legal obligations in-
terpreted by the District of Columbia Circuit and
examines, on policy grounds, which principle should
govern.
Official United States policy has offered staunch sup-
port to the Chicago Convention.14' Existing policy in
1980 was stated as follows: "[T]he U.S. favors and en-
courages compliance with the Convention on Interna-
tional Civil Aviation and recommends that ICAO
Standards and Recommended Practices be applied to U.S.
See id. at 200, noting the attitude of the British Civil Aviation Authority.
Annex 8, supra note 78, at 7.
,4,655 F.2d 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
14 K. POWER, supra note 3, at 12 (the United States, being a primary benefactor
as well as originator, has supported fully the aims and objectives of ICAO).
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national aviation practices as soon as practicable" and
"the accomplishments of ICAO to date, particularly in
promoting safety of international aviation and in facilitat-
ing international air commerce, have fully demonstrated
the need for the continuance of cooperative efforts in fos-
tering the development of international civil aviation."1 42
Indeed, as early as the summer of 1946, as Congress was
considering ratification of the Chicago Convention, the
executive branch declared that "the Board [now
DOT/FAA] pursuant to section 1102, must act 'consist-
ently with any obligation assumed by the United States in
such agreement and, therefore, within the broad policy'
declared in the agreement."'' 43 While the broad policy of
the Chicago Convention would not forbid the Civil Aero-
nautics Board or its successors from regulating such com-
mercial matters as foreign carrier qualification for section
402 permits, 44 or the setting of domestic airport landing
fees,145 the thrust of the United States position was to ac-
cord strong support to the need for international cooper-
ation addressed in the Chicago Convention.
Despite this strong pro-Chicago Convention policy, Ad-
ministrator Bond felt it essential to issue SFAR 40 in view
of the specific safety concerns raised by the DC-10 crash
I d. In light of SFAR 40, however, the suggestion that '[i]n accordance with
the ICAO Convention, the U.S. will not impose restrictions or obligations on
other ICAO Member States regarding the competency of its personnel or its air-
worthiness" must be questioned, at least in circumstances where the United States
strongly disagrees with other Contracting States over potential safety problems.
See id.
1. 40 Op. Att'y Gen. 451, 453 (1946).
144 Foreign Permit Investigation, 34 C.A.B. 837, 839 (1961); see also 40 Op. Att'y
Gen. 451, 452 (1946) (before foreign air carrier permits are issued by the United
States to foreign airlines, they must qualify under the provisions of the Civil Aero-
nautics Act) (quoting message of President to Congress on June 11, 1946).
,4. See Indianapolis Airport Auth. v. American Airlines, Inc., 733 F.2d 1262,
1266 (7th Cir. 1984). The court states:
As a treaty of the United States ... the Convention has the force of a
federal statute. But it does not regulate airport fees. It establishes a
Council with broad powers and the Council has recommended stan-
dards that require that landing fees and other airport charges be rea-
sonable, but these standards ... are not intended to have the force
of law.
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and subsequent investigation. Though almost certainly
aware of the international law difficulties posed by such an
order, 14 6 he feared a grave threat to public safety if the
DC-10 aircraft was indeed of defective design. When the
European Civil Aviation Authorities resolved their own
airworthiness concerns more rapidly than the FAA, Ad-
ministrator Bond refused to compromise his own safety
concerns, as would have been required to comply with Ar-
ticle 33. This action of issuing and maintaining SFAR 40
after European recertification has been described as
"made in defiance of international law," 147 and was held
by the District of Columbia Circuit to violate United
States treaty obligations. But, properly conceived, should
international aviation law place a national aviation author-
ity in the dilemma faced by Administrator Bond of
whether to compromise domestic views on safety or
breach the reciprocal recognition rule? Or, alternatively,
should there be sufficient flexibility to permit unilateral
action when specific factors give rise to a disagreement
about safety?
Both safety and promotion of a convenient system of
international navigation must be fundamental objectives
of international aviation law. In routine circumstances,
the latter objective is well served by the Article 33 recipro-
cal recognition principle.1 48 This system avoids the enor-
mous repetition of certification efforts which would be
necessary were each State to independently certify all air-
craft operating in its airspace. It additionally avoids a risk
of uneven application of certification standards for ulte-
rior purposes. Where a bona fide disagreement regarding
safety exists between States, however, the benefits of con-
14.1 See British Caledonian, 665 F.2d at 1156. The fact that Administrator Bond
was most probably aware of the Article 33 obligations at the time SFAR 40 was
issued is immaterial. The real period of dispute was that following recertification
by the European Civil Aviation Authorities between June 19 and June 25, 1979,
and July 13, 1979, when the FAA rescinded SFAR 40. By that point, Administra-
tor Bond and his staff were without doubt alerted to the Article 33 obligations at
the Zurich and Paris meetings.
147 Richard, supra note 125, at 214.
148 See Chicago Convention, supra note 2.
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venience and assurance of fair play are outweighed in the
mind of the concerned State by the paramount interest in
ensuring safety. This primary objective so overwhelms all
other aviation objectives, including an efficient interna-
tional navigation system, that no State with legitimate
safety concerns can be asked or expected to compromise
those concerns to further other international aviation
goals. Where safety concerns are sufficiently strong, such
a State would be prepared to watch international air travel
come to a halt, rather than operate under conditions con-
sidered unsafe according to its own national standards. 149
Certainly every State, including the United States, must
recognize that it cannot engage in unfettered or indis-
criminate unilateral action and hope to retain the benefits
of a smoothly operating international air navigation sys-
tem. Such a system necessarily entails reciprocal conces-
sions of otherwise exclusive territorial sovereignty and
deference to the airworthiness determinations of other
States. In return, similar international recognition of
one's own airworthiness decisions is granted. The degree
of cooperation which has been achieved through the Arti-
cle 33 and Annex 8 system of mutual respect and mini-
mum standards, and the benefits flowing therefrom,
should not be lightly disturbed. Before risking damage to
this delicate balance of international cooperation, a State
should be certain that there is a true dispute related to
safety, examine whether its safety concerns might be re-
dressed without unilateral action, and, finally, weigh the
strength of its concern for safety against the damage
threatened to the less crucial but still very important ob-
jective of ease of international navigation. Where the per-
141, In general, it would be expected that the disagreement over safety would not
extend to the entire international air navigation system, but rather would be lim-
ited to a matter such as a specific aircraft, specific carrier, or perhaps a particular
airport. The risk to the system as a whole is present primarily through the risk of
retaliation. What this article suggests is that even in the face of retaliation leading
to complete breakdown, a State with a serious safety concern would not compro-
mise that concern for the dubious benefit of an international navigation system
which it regarded as at least in part unsafe.
THE CHICAGO CONVENTION
ceived threat to safety remains intolerable despite the
inconvenience which may result to international travel,
however, that State should, under international law, be
left room to act according to its own views on safety.1 50
Where a situation occurs which fits these criteria, as did
the DC-10 crisis, providing a degree of flexibility in the
international law framework amounts to a practical imper-
ative. The SFAR 40 dispute arose between the United
States, which claimed a policy strongly favoring interna-
tional cooperation under the Chicago Convention system,
and a group of sophisticated Western European aviation
nations whose airworthiness judgment the United States
would be expected to be most inclined to respect. Even in
these favorable circumstances, the United States was not
prepared to compromise an overriding safety concern.
International law should recognize this practical impera-
tive and accept that international legal obligations alone
cannot overcome significant safety disagreements. Com-
promise of legitimate national concerns about safety can-
not be compelled. However, international law should also
recognize the risk posed by such disagreements for the
international navigation system and strive to put in place a
mechanism for minimizing the duration of disputes and
the damage arising therefrom.
ICAO's retreat from setting detailed international air-
worthiness standards also suggests that a more restrictive
interpretation of the Article 33 obligations might now be
appropriate. Those obligations might properly be limited
1.1( Even should exercise of unilateral action be carefully circumscribed as sug-
gested here, the mere opportunity of such action may be criticized as inviting
abuse. Certainly, unscrupulous states might, for ulterior political or economic
motives, allege a spurious safety concern about the aircraft of a particular state.
This risk is certainly present, and perhaps of foremost concern to the United
States. But it is also a cost which must be accepted if states wish to retain some
flexibility to determine bonafide safety concerns according to their own standards.
The problem may also be more theoretical than real. Where such conduct would
occur, the relationship between the states involved could be expected to be such
that exchange of air traffic would be minimal or nonexistent. Further, even abso-
lute international obligations under such circumstances would likely pose a mini-
mal barrier to unilateral conduct.
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to routine circumstances, recognizing the need for greater
flexibility in the exceptional circumstances of a serious
safety disagreement. When the language of Article 33
was developed in 1944, it was anticipated that a uniform
international airworthiness code would be developed by
ICAO. Had it been possible to successfully establish and
keep current such a code-an approach which at least in
concept would have encouraged a single global airworthi-
ness determination - stronger grounds would exist to re-
fuse to derogate from Article 33 obligations even in
exceptional circumstances.' With the relinquishing of
detailed standards to national codes, however, the en-
hanced reasons to insist on compliance with national stan-
dards in the export/import context led to widespread use
of bilateral agreements outside the Chicago Convention
system for those transactions. Similarly, where a signifi-
cant safety disagreement exists and the reasons to insist
on compliance with national airworthiness standards be-
come compelling, there is equal reason to suggest that the
obligations under Article 33 should be regarded as less
than absolute.
Even if some flexibility for unilateral action is an una-
voidable necessity when a significant safety dispute arises,
such action may impose heavy economic costs and se-
verely strain international relations. While this paper sug-
gests that international law cannot reasonably prohibit
unilateral action in all circumstances, an international fo-
rum should be provided to facilitate the quickest possible
resolution of safety disagreements and thus end the need
'1' Common standards alone would not solve all differences in airworthiness
judgment. Interpretation and application of those standards will continue to play
a role. Indeed, many states have adopted outright or patterned their airworthi-
ness codes closely after the United States Federal Aviation Regulations [FARs],
which have accordingly come to comprise something of an international airwor-
thiness code. A notable exception to this pattern is the United Kingdom. See
Note, supra note 109, at 321 n.69.
In the DC-10 dispute, several of the European nations involved, including Ger-
many and Switzerland, were interpreting national codes identical to the United
States FARs; Italy was interpreting a code based on the United States FARs. The
safety disagreement arose notwithstanding these common standards. Id.
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for unilateral action. It is in this role that ICAO might
best serve, perhaps through the Airworthiness Commit-
tee, which could draw upon its expertise in evaluating
airworthiness. 52
Several general considerations should guide the struc-
ture of whatever mechanism is used to help resolve inter-
national safety disagreements. Most importantly, no
obligation should be forced on the State concerned about
safety to compromise its safety concerns. 53  There
should, however, be an obligation placed on States taking
unilateral action to promptly approach the Airworthiness
Committee or other body and set out the compelling basis
for such action. Should the issue be raised, the Airworthi-
ness Committee should offer preliminary comments on
the bonafides of the safety concerns. Immediate consulta-
tions would then be arranged where all affected States
would jointly attempt to resolve differences. The Airwor-
thiness Committee could assist as mediator, either from
the outset or at the request of any State involved. In the
meantime, an effort should be made to minimize unequal
economic impact from the dispute, perhaps through an-
other body within ICAO. Throughout the consultation
process, the ever-present risk of retaliation, threatening
1-12 See CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION, THE FIRST 40 YEARS,
supra note 42, at 20, which describes the composition and purposes of the Airwor-
thiness Committee:
To keep up with latest technology, a standing committee of experts
known as the Airworthiness Committee meets regularly at ICAO. It
comprises representatives from aircraft manufacturers as well as rep-
resentatives from leading manufacturing states, who, on a daily ba-
sis, are concerned with aircraft airworthiness. Their technical know-
how helps prepare draft regulations which are sent out to states and,
if approved, become part of Annex 8.
Id.
J.%-J Naturally, if contracting states could agree upon compulsory jurisdiction
and adjudicatory powers for a dispute resolution forum such as the Airworthiness
Committee, an airworthiness determination could be concluded through an inter-
national tribunal. Tribunal decisions might be enforced by ostracizing those
States refusing to comply with such airworthiness determinations. While such a
system is certainly an option, potential drawbacks include delay and problematic
enforcement proceedings against a State remaining concerned over safety
problems. It is suggested that a process which aims toward consensus is superior.
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escalating damage to international navigation, would pro-
vide a built-in incentive to resolve matters quickly and
avoid allegations of contrived disagreements or bad faith
negotiations.
Imposing such obligations would not necessarily in-
volve an amendment to Article 33. Many obligations re-
lated to airworthiness, such as that to provide mandatory
continuing airworthiness information, have been incorpo-
rated into Annex 8. As demonstrated by the District of
Columbia Circuit in British Caledonian, Annex 8 is to be
consulted in assessing the proper scope of Article 33.154
Were Annex 8 amended to specify procedures contem-
plating possible unilateral action, Article 33 might appro-
priately receive a less unqualified interpretation. An
amendment to Annex 8 could include additional criteria
thought to be sensible, such as whether the State of manu-
facture might indeed be given special deference over de-
sign-related safety issues. The Chicago Convention itself
provides Annex amending procedures.1 55 Under Article
90, the ICAO Council may adopt amendments and addi-
tions to Annex 8 by a two-thirds majority vote. The
amendments become effective three months after commu-
nication to contracting States unless a majority of States
register their disapproval.1 56
CONCLUSION
A viable system of international air navigation demands
extensive cooperation in many areas. With regard to air-
worthiness, as long as States continue to make individual
airworthiness assessments, some basis for reciprocal rec-
ognition of national airworthiness judgments is essential.
The drafters of the Chicago Convention sought to insure
such cooperation among contracting States by adopting
Article 33, a reciprocal recognition rule qualified only by
the right to insist on compliance with minimum standards.
See British Caledonian, 665 F.2d at 1160-61, 1164-65.
15 See Chicago Convention, supra note 2, at Art. 90.
Id.
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With the growth of a complex, highly developed net-
work of international commercial aviation, the practical
implications of this rule to daily operations became in-
creasingly important. Any deviation from this rule
promises heavy financial impact on today's international
carriers. It was such economic consequences, and the
threat they might be repeated, that propelled the Euro-
pean carriers into court in British Caledonian 157 and
Balair. 158
This paper has sought to accord full weight to this im-
portant air navigation objective, both in recognizing the
existing legal obligations under Article 33 and in sug-
gesting these should not be lightly upset. The hand-
wringing dilemma faced by Administrator Bond during
the DC-10 crisis, however, has prompted a re-examination
of considerations which intrude on the Article 33 obliga-
tion. This paper argues that national concerns for safety
in such crisis conditions must be recognized as para-
mount, even at the expense of the international naviga-
tion system. This is not because the State with the safety
concerns should be favored as necessarily more cautious.
Indeed, although raised in good faith, such concerns may
ultimately prove ill-founded, a fact which other States will
maintain was apparent all along. Rather, it is because a
State not convinced of safety must be recognized as enti-
tled to place that safety concern above all else. Accord-
ingly, in extraordinary circumstances, international
aviation law should contemplate limited flexibility to the
reciprocal recognition rule, sponsor a forum to resolve
safety disagreements as rapidly as possible, and cultivate
the penalties available within the system to discourage
abuse.
157 British Caledonian, 665 F.2d at 1153.
,- 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) at 17,692.
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